Microeconomics IV · ISET · 2026

Game Theory

This eight-week master's course covers decision-theoretic foundations, strategic and extensive-form games, equilibrium refinements, and games of incomplete information. The slides closely follow the relevant chapters in Roger Myerson's Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Lecture slides and companion notes are available below.

Lecture Slides

01Decision-Theoretic FoundationsRational choice and expected utility foundations.PDF 02Basic Models of Game TheoryPlayers, strategies, payoffs, and core game models.PDF 03Equilibria of Strategic-Form GamesRationalizability and Nash equilibrium.PDF 04Equilibria of Extensive-Form GamesDynamic interaction and sequential rationality.PDF 05Refinements of EquilibriumRefinements of Nash equilibrium in strategic form.PDF 06Static Games of Incomplete InformationPrivate information and Bayesian games.PDF 07Dynamic Games with Incomplete InformationSignaling, beliefs, and dynamic Bayesian interaction.PDF

Companion Notes

Expected Utility TheoryA crash course on risky choice and the vNM representation theorem.PDF Subjective Expected UtilityThe Anscombe-Aumann approach to subjective probabilities.PDF

Recitations and Solutions

Problem sets and their corresponding solutions.

01 Decision-Theoretic FoundationsRecitation 1 Problem Set Solutions

02 Basic Models of Game TheoryRecitation 2 Problem Set Solutions

03 Equilibria of Strategic-Form GamesRecitation 3 Problem Set Solutions

04 Equilibria of Extensive-Form GamesRecitation 4 Problem Set Solutions

05 Equilibrium Refinements and Bayesian GamesRecitation 5 Problem Set Solutions